Despite the fact that one-third of worldwide mergers involve firms from different countries, the vast majority of the academic literature on mergers studies domestic mergers. What little has been written about cross-border mergers has focused on public firms, usually from the United States. Yet, the vast majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms that are not from the United States. We provide an analysis of a sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers occurring between 1990 and 2007. We first characterize the patterns of who buys whom: Geography matters, with firms being much more likely to purchase firms in nearby countries than in countries far away. Purchasers are usually but not always from developed countries and they tend to purchase firms in countries with lower investor protection and accounting standards. A significant factor in determining acquisition patterns is currency movements; firms tend to purchase firms from countries relative to which the acquirer's currency has appreciated. In addition economy-wide factors reflected in the country's stock market returns lead to acquisitions as well. Both the currency and stock market effect could reflect either misvaluation or wealth explanations. Our evidence is more consistent with the wealth explanation than the misvaluation explanation.
mergers. We estimate the effect of these factors on merger propensities using a sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers occurring between 1990 and 2007.
In contrast to most of the prior literature that focuses on mergers of public acquirers and targets involving U.S. firms, our sample better reflects the universe of cross-border mergers, the majority of which involve private firms, mostly from outside of the U.S. In our sample, 80% of completed cross-border deals between 1990 and 2007 targeted a non-US firm, while 75% did not involve a US firm as an acquirer. The majority of acquirers (90%) are from "developed" countries, while the other 10% being from "developing" countries. A surprisingly large number of cross-border transactions involve firms in Eastern Europe (2,115 deals), Asia (7,009 deals), South America (2,587 deals), Africa (853 deals), Central America (810 deals), and Middle East (617 deals). Furthermore, the vast majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms as either bidder or target: 96% of the deals involve a private target, 26% involve a private acquirer, and 97% have either private acquirers or targets. Hence, the inclusion of private firms in our analysis is important, especially since most other studies use samples of publicly-traded firms or lump private acquisitions in with other investments as foreign direct investment (FDI).
Our results suggest that valuation differences between acquirers and targets significantly affect the likelihood of a cross-border merger. The cross-border acquirer is more likely to be from a country whose currency has appreciated relative to the target's currency and whose country's stock market has outperformed the target firm's country's market. In addition, if the companies are public, the acquirer's firm-specific abnormal performance is likely to be better than the target's. The estimated effects are fairly large: Our estimates imply that a 100% difference in country-level stock returns between two countries leads to a 17.4% increase in the expected number of acquisitions of the worse performing country's firms by the better-performing country's firms. Similarly, a 75% appreciation of one country's currency relative to another's leads to a 50.4% increase in the number of acquisitions of firms in countries with relatively depreciated currency.
Differences in valuation can affect merger propensities through two main channels. Froot and Stein (1991) argue that differences in wealth that occur because of exchange rate or other shocks provide a financing advantage, lowering the cost of a potential acquisition. A wealthier country effectively has a lower cost of capital, leading its firms to purchase assets outside the country, including other companies. More generally, international acquisitions provide a way in which newly wealthier shareholders can increase their exposure internationally without purchasing foreign stocks.
In addition, valuations can drive mergers if these valuations diverge from fundamentals (see Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , Dong et al. (2006) , Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) , and Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009) ). Given misvaluation, managers of a relatively overvalued firm will have incentives to purchase relatively undervalued assets, especially if they can use their overvalued stocks as a means of payment. In an international context this divergence from fundamentals could occur for two reasons: First, overall investor sentiment could vary across countries, creating a wedge in firm values in the local-currency across countries. Second, the currencies in which the companies are valued can appreciate or depreciate more than is warranted by changes in underlying economic conditions, leading the companies to be relatively misvalued.
We focus on measures of relative valuation between bidders and targets at the country level, and, when possible, at the firm level. We consider the relative stock market performance of the countries of the acquiring and target firms prior to the mergers, broken up into local currency and exchange rate components. We also analyze a country-level 'market-to-book' measure, similar to that used by Baker et al. (2009) . Further, we examine the relative firm-level stock performance as well as the market-to-book ratios of the subsample of mergers between public acquirers and targets.
Based on univariate comparisons of pre-merger performance between bidders and targets, acquirers outperform targets by all measures. The local-currency return of the acquirer is 0.3% higher during the 12 months, 0.92% the 24 months, and 2.12% during the 36 months before the deal occurs. Similarly, the exchange rate of the acquirer tends to appreciate relative to that of the target before the deal, 1.12%, 2.13% and 3.43% in the 12, 24 and 36 months prior to the mergers, respectively. Given these results, not surprisingly, the market-to-book ratio of the acquirers' countries is 9.93% higher at the time of the deal. This pattern is true for both private and public acquirers and targets.
When we restrict ourselves to public acquirers and targets so that we can compare the firmlevel returns, we again find that acquirers outperform targets prior to the acquisitions. The difference in local-currency returns is 10.38%, 19.34%, and 23.36% for 12, 24 and 36 months prior to the acquisition, respectively. In addition, the average market to book ratio is higher for acquirers than for targets, mirroring for what has previously been documented for U.S. domestic acquisitions (see Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) ).
We next evaluate the possibility that valuation could motivate cross-border mergers in a multivariate context. We first estimate models predicting the number of deals in a particular countrypair as a function of relative market conditions in the two countries. We find that differences in local currency returns as well as exchange rate returns predict the volume of mergers between particular country pairs. In addition, differences in country-level market to book ratios predict cross-border merger volume as well. These findings are consistent with the view that the difference in valuation is an important driver of cross-border merger activity.
We consider the types of mergers for which stock-market and currency valuation differences appear to be the most important motives. Our results suggest that currency movements predict mergers mostly for within-region country-pairs and also appear to be most important when the acquiring country is wealthier than the target. This pattern is consistent with the view that firms in wealthier countries purchase firms in poorer nearby countries because they are relatively inexpensive following currency depreciation. We also find that valuation differences in country-level stock market predict mergers mostly when the acquiring country is wealthier than the target, consistent with the view that firms in wealthier countries purchase foreign firms following a decline in the poorer country's stock market.
There are two potential (though not mutually exclusive) explanations for the stock-return differences between acquirer and targets prior to the acquisitions. First, the returns can affect changes in the relative wealth of the two countries. Second, the returns can reflect differential divergence from fundamentals. We use an approach suggested by Baker et al. (2009) to differentiate the two explanations. In particular, we estimate an equation predicting a country's market to book ratio using future returns. Baker et al. (2009) suggest that the fitted values from such a regression should reflect overvaluation while the residuals reflect a wealth effect. We find evidence consistent with the wealth effect, which is strong in magnitude and persistent across different sub-samples, rather than the mispricing effect.
We then examine at the deal level whether valuation differences drive cross-border M&As controlling for firm-specific factors. We find that differences in US dollar firm returns predict higher likelihood of cross-border deals compared to domestic deals. Furthermore, when we decompose valuation differences between acquiring and target firms to three components, we find that acquiring firms in cross-border mergers outperform their domestic capital market.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous literature on cross-country mergers, including some relevant papers on FDI. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents the results while Section 5 concludes.
Prior literature on Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
Despite the fact that a large proportion of worldwide merger activity involves firms from different countries, the voluminous literature on mergers has focused almost exclusively on domestic deals.
3 While this literature also helps to understand international mergers, it does not address a number of factors related to country-based differences between firms. Nonetheless, there has been some work on cross-border mergers, which tends to either lump together mergers with other international investments as FDI or to analyze only mergers between public firms.
Much of earlier work has focused on synergies, marketing ability, or technological advantages to explain why a foreign firm would value domestic assets more highly than would a domestic firm (see Graham and Krugman (1995) for a summary). Other factors including relative labor costs and tax incentives have been used to explain the general pattern that FDI flows from developed to less developed countries (e.g. Cushman (1987) and Swenson (1989) ).
However, none of these studies provide theoretical justification for a relation between currency movements and cross-border mergers or other components of FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) suggest one such story, in which wealth effects matter because information problems in financial contracting cause external financing to be more costly than internal financing. When a firm's value increases, so does its access to capital relative to alternative bidders whose value did not increase by as much. Consequently, when a potential foreign acquirer's value increases, for example through unhedged exchange rate changes or stock market fluctuations, then the potential foreign acquirer can bid more aggressively for domestic assets than domestic rival bidders can do. In equilibrium, relative value changes lead to an increase in cross-border acquisitions by firms in the relatively wealthy country. The prediction that FDI increases following exchange rate movements has been tested by Klein and Rosengren (1994), Dewenter (1995) For the public firms in our M&A sample, we obtain accounting and ownership information from Worldscope. In particular, Worldscope provides firm-level data on firm size (book value of total assets), book leverage (long-term debt divided by total assets), cash ratio (cash holdings divided by total assets), two-year geometric sales growth, and return on equity as well as the market-to-book ratio of the equity.
Results

Stylized Facts about Cross-Border Mergers.
Mergers involving acquirers and targets from different countries are substantial, both in terms of absolute number, and the value of deals as a fraction of worldwide M&A activity. Panel A of Figure 1 plots the quantity of cross-border deals over our sample period. As with domestic deals, the volume of cross-border mergers increases throughout the 1990s, declines after the stock market crash One fact that is clearly evident is that most cross-border mergers do not involve U.S. firms. Figure 2 graphs the fraction of U.S. acquirers and targets over time, both weighting each deal equally and by deal size. In most years, between 12 and 28 percent of acquirers are from the U.S. and between 20 and 37 percent of the targets are from the U.S. When we weigh by deal size, the fraction of U.S. deals grows somewhat but still the overwhelming majority of deals do not involve U.S. firms. Table 1 characterizes the pattern of cross-country acquisitions in our sample. The columns represent the countries of the acquiring companies while the rows represent those of the target companies. The diagonal entries of the matrix are therefore the number domestic mergers for a particular country and the off-diagonal entries are the number of deals in a particular country pair.
The totals exclude domestic mergers and hence represent the number of cross-border mergers to and from a particular country. The country with the largest number of acquisitions is the U.S.; U.S. firms were acquirers in 15,034 cross-border mergers and were targets in 11,886 mergers, which is substantial but certainly do not represent the majority of the 56,978 cross-border mergers.
A casual glance at 
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers
To analyze the cross-sectional patterns among acquirers and targets formally, we use a multivariate regression framework. We consider all (ordered) country pairs, and construct a variable that equals the number of acquisitions by firms in one country of firms in the second at any point during the sample period, normalized by the total number of domestic acquisitions in the target country. This variable provides a measure of the propensity of firms of one country to acquire firms of another one. In a similar fashion, we construct the intensities of cross-border deals separately using only public target and acquirers and private target and acquirers.
We then estimate equations predicting this variable as a function of the characteristics of the countries. Since each observation is a "country pair", the total number of observations is the square of the number of observations minus the number of observations (37×36 = 1332). We include the stock return difference of the country indices (average annual local real stock market return) and the relative appreciation of the two countries' currencies (the average annual real exchange rate return) over the entire sample period because, as we have argued above, changes in relative valuation are likely to lead to acquisitions. Regulatory and legal differences between countries are potential causes of cross-border acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin (2004)), so we include the difference in the LLSV measures of accounting quality (an index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information) and legal protection (the product of the "Rule of Law" and "Anti-director Rights" variables). To capture the regional effect discussed above, we include the distance between the capital cities of a country pair. 8 To evaluate if a common culture makes mergers more likely, we include variables indicating whether the target and acquirer's primary religion, are the same and whether their primary language (English, Spanish or others) are the same (Stulz and Williamson (2003)). To reflect the differences in wealth between any pair of countries as well as the change in this difference, we include the difference in the log of gross national product in 1990 (in US dollars) divided by the population and the average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product from 1990 to 2007
(source: WDI report). Finally, each equation contains dummies for each country (so that each observation has two dummy variables, one of the acquirer and one for the target country).
9 Table 3 contains estimates of this equation. There are a number of patterns among acquirers and targets. First, the regional effect discussed above is evident; holding other things constant, being closer to one another substantially increases the likelihood that there are acquisitions between two countries. Second, there is a currency effect. Firms from countries whose currencies appreciated over the sample period tended to be purchasers of firms whose currency tended to depreciate. Third, consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) , having a better legal protection of minority shareholders' rights and having higher quality accounting disclosure system each increase the likelihood that firms from a country will be purchasers of firms from another country. Finally the likelihood that a firm from one country purchases a firm from another increases when the two countries share a common language. There is no evidence that sharing a common religion has any impact on merger propensities. 8 We obtain latitude and longitude of capital cities of each country from http://www.mapsofworld.com/utilities/world-latitude-longitude.htm. We then apply the standard formula: 3963.0 * arcos [sin(lat1) * sin(lat2) + cos (lat1) * cos (lat2) * cos (lon2 -lon1)], where lon and lat are the longitudes and latitudes of the acquirer and the target country locations, respectively. 9 We have also estimated equations similar to those in Table 3 including bilateral trade flow calculated as the value of imports by destination country from origin country as a percentage of total imports by destination country (source: United Nation Commodity Trade database). The idea of including this variable is that trade flow is likely to be related to the amount of business done between two countries and consequently the synergistic motives for mergers. The results from this specification are similar to those reported below except that the coefficient on the trade variable is positive and statistically significant. We do not include this variable because it is not available for roughly 15% of the country pairs in our sample. Table 4 summarizes the valuation differences between acquirers and targets. As measures of valuation, we report differences in market to book, differences in exchange rate returns, and differences in local-currency stock returns prior to the acquisition, both at the country and firm levels.
Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Univariate Evidence
We report the country-level stock returns, the firm-level stock returns, and currency returns each for 1, 2 and 3 years intervals prior to the acquisition.
The first column presents these return differences for the entire sample of cross-border mergers. For both the level of valuation (the market to book ratio) and the recent change in valuation (both through local stock market returns and by change in the exchange rate), acquirers are valued higher than targets. The market-to-book ratio averages almost 10% higher for acquiring countries than for target countries. In addition, the average local stock market returns are higher for acquiring firm countries than target firm countries, by 0.3% in the first year before the merger, 0.92% in the two years prior to the merger and by 2.12% over the three years prior to the merger. Finally, the exchange rate of acquiring companies appreciates relative to that of the target companies, by 1.12%
in the year prior the acquisition, by 2.13% in the two years and 3.43% of the three years prior to the acquisition. All these results are consistent with the view that firms purchase firms when they are relatively highly valued, either because of a wealth effect or to take advantage of overvaluation.
For the subsample of mergers for which the acquirers and targets are both publicly traded and hence have observable stock returns, acquirers substantially outperform targets prior to the acquisitions. The differences are much larger than the country-level differences, about 10% in the year prior to the acquisition, 19% in the two-year period prior to the acquisition and 23% in the three- (2005)).
This pattern can be clearly seen in Panel A of Figure 3 . Prior to month 0, the month of the acquisition, both the local currency return and exchange rate return differences are positive, meaning that the acquirer's country's stock market outperformed the target's and that the acquirer's currency appreciated relative to the targets during the 3 years prior to the acquisition. Subsequent to the acquisition, however, the local currency return difference disappears, meaning that the target country outperforms the acquirer's during the 3 years subsequent to the acquisition. However, the acquirer's currency continues to appreciate, leaving the common-currency returns in the two countries' stock markets approximately the same following the acquisitions.
We break down the pre-acquisition returns by characteristics of the deals in the remaining columns of Table 4 . The second through fifth columns consider deals by whether the acquirer and target are from developing or developed countries, using the World Bank definition of "high income"
economies. 10 The pre-acquisition local return differences are positive for each category although they are substantially larger when a developed acquirer buys a developed target and when a developing acquirer buys a developed target (12.79% and 9.54% differences for the two categories for the three years prior to the acquisition). However the currency movements prior to the deal go in opposite directions for these two categories. When a developing acquirer buys a developed target the acquirer's currency actually depreciates prior to the acquisition. On the other hand, when a developed acquirer buys a developing target, it generally follows a period of strong relative appreciation. This pattern could reflect a general appreciation of developed currencies relative to developing ones over our sample period and suggests that we should control for these effects econometrically (as we do below).
10 It is not obvious how one should define countries as developing or developed. We have used alternative definitions of developing and developed and the pattern of preacquistion returns is similar to what report here. Besides world bank definition of "high income" countries, we also use the "developed" definition in Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) . If claims on private sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP and the total value traded on the stock market as a share of GDP in a given country are both below period mean, the country is flagged as "developing".
In Columns 6-9 of Table 4 , we report pre-acquisition valuation differences for different legal regimes in the acquiring and target countries. 11 In general, weak law target countries are associated with higher pre-acquisition differences, in terms of market to book ratios, local currency returns and exchange rate returns, especially when the acquirer is from a strong law country. This pattern suggests that governance-driven cross-border acquisitions characterized by Rossi and Volpin (2004) tend to occur during times when the target company's country is doing relatively poorly. The potential governance improvements from the stronger legal protection appear to be supplemented by a valuation effect.
In the final four columns of Table 4 , we break down the valuation differences by whether the acquirer and target are from the same region of the world, and also by whether they are related or diversifying mergers. 12 In general the valuation metrics are similar regardless of whether the acquirer and target are in the same or different regions. However, the valuation differences tend to be somewhat larger for related than for diversifying mergers for most of the measures of valuation we use.
Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Multivariate Evidence
To formally evaluate the hypothesis that relative valuation can affect merger propensities, we rely on a multivariate framework that controls for other potentially relevant factors. It is not obvious, however, what the most natural approach is to address this question. One possibility is to use deal level data on the acquirer's and target's market valuations. This approach has the advantage of utilizing the most accurate measure of firm values in the comparison. However, it has the disadvantage of only being usable for the subsample of deals having both public acquirers and public targets. As discussed above, the vast majority of cross-border acquisitions have either private 11 If the Shareholder Protection Index (the product of "Rule of Law" and "Antidirector Rights" variables from La Porta et al. (1998) ) is below median, we categorize the country as "Weak Law". 12 If target and acquirer's countries are from the same broadly-defined continent (Africa, America, Asia, and Europe), we call the deal "same region" (Source: World Atlas 1995). We define deals as "related" if the target firm and the acquiring firm have the same 3-digit SIC code. acquirers or targets (or both), so using deal level data necessitates discarding the vast majority of the sample. An alternative approach relies on country-level data. This approach has the disadvantage of ignoring firm-level information (where available) but has the advantage of being able to utilize the entire sample of deals. In addition, a number of hypotheses of interest, in particular those concerning currency movements and country-level stock market movements, are testable using country level data. Since each approach has both advantages and disadvantages, we use both: We first estimate equations using the entire sample of deals using country-level data on market indices, valuation levels, and exchange rates. We then estimate similar equations with deal-level data on the smaller sample of deals involving public acquirers and targets.
We estimate an econometric specification in which the dependent variable is the number of deals for a particular country pair in a specified year, normalized by the total number of deals for that target country in that year. 13 Our sample consists of country pairs with one observation per year for each pair, for a total of 16,524 observations. To control for the cross-sectional factors discussed above as well as long-term trends in currency movements that affect merger propensities (Table 3) , we include country-pair fixed effects. 14 This specification allows us to exploit time-series variation in relative valuations while controlling for cross-country differences. We estimate the equation using OLS and report heteroskedastic-consistent estimates of the standard errors. Table 5 presents estimates of this equation. The stock return and currency differences are measured over the 12 months prior to the year in question. 15 "∆Currency R12" is the difference in the past 12-month real exchange-rate return between acquirer and target country currencies. "∆Market R12" is the difference in the past 12-month local real stock-market return between acquirer and target 13 We have also estimated all equations reported below using a dependent variable equal to the log of one plus the normalized number of deals from a particular country pair. The results using this alternative dependent variable are similar to those reported below. 14 Note that the pairs are ordered, so that, for example, there would be a U.S.-Canada dummy variable as well as a Canada-U.S. dummy variable in each equation. 15 We have also estimated these equations using 24 and 36 month windows for measuring stock and currency returns prior to the acquisition with similar results. In addition, we have estimated these equations on U.S. and non-U.S. subsamples, again with results similar to those reported in Table 5. country market indices, while "∆Market MTB" is the difference in the value-weighted market-tobook equity ratio between acquirer and target country. All equations also include differences in the log of GDP and the differences in GDP growth rates as well as year and country-pair dummies.
Columns 1-6 include all deals, columns 7-12 restrict the sample to deals involving private acquirers and targets, while columns 13-18 include only public acquirers and targets.
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Columns 1, 7 and 13 present the basic regression for each group of deals. Except in the public-firms subsample, the coefficients on the return and currency differences, as well as the GDP and growth differences, are positive and statistically significantly different from zero. These positive coefficients on the valuation differences imply that when valuations are higher in one country than another, the expected number of acquisitions by the first country's firms of the second country's firms increases. To interpret the magnitudes of these coefficients, it is convenient to calculate the percentage increase in expected acquisitions for a country pair implied by a given return differential.
Interpreted this way, the coefficients in Panel A of Table 5 imply that for 100% difference in local currency returns leads to a 17.4% increase in the expected number of acquisitions for a particular country pair. 17 Similarly, a 75% difference in exchange rate returns implies a 50.4% increase in acquisitions. 18 These effects appear to be fairly large, implying that the effects of valuation on merger probabilities are substantial.
19 16 We restrict the sample to those country-pairs with at least one merger at some point during the sample period. We have estimated these equations using samples including all country pairs, as well as only those country pairs with at least 10 mergers over the entire sample. In each case the results are similar to those reported in Table 5 . 17 The average ratio of cross-border merger to domestic mergers for a given country-pair in a given year is 0.0461. Using the coefficient of the country-level 12 month real stock returns in column (1) of Table 5 , we can calculate the percentage change in the ratio for an average country pair: (0.008*100%)/0.0461=17.4%. We emphasize that 100% country-level 12 month stock return difference between target and acquirer is not a rare event. In our sample, 55 country-pairs had a return difference at least this large. 18 Similar to our calculation for country-level stock market returns, the percentage change in the number of crossborder merger when there is a 75% difference in exchange rate returns, is (0.031*75%)/0.0461=50.4%. Note also that 75% difference between target and acquirer in currency movement is not a rare event. 95 country-pairs had such experience in the past 15 years, mostly due to currency depreciation in target countries, e.g. Turkey and Brazil (1994), and Argentina and Peru (1990) . 19 The linear specification is convenient, but it is possible that there are important nonlinearities it does not capture. We intend to investigate this possibility in future drafts of this paper. In particular, we intend to explore the extent Columns 2, 8 and 14 of Table 5 , break up the local market and currency returns by a dummy variable which equals 1 if the GDP per capita in the acquirer country is larger than that in the target country, while Columns 3, 9 and 15 perform a similar decomposition for regional differences. The findings in these columns indicate that both the stock return and currency differences have the largest impact on merger propensities when firms from wealthier countries are considering purchasing firms from poorer countries. The regional decomposition indicates that the currency effect is largest for country-pairs in the same region. However, for the whole sample, the stock market effect is positive and statistically significantly different from zero for out-of-region deals and equals zero for mergers within a region.
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Columns 4, 10 and 16 consider how country-level differences in market-to-book ratios affect merger likelihoods. The coefficients on the market to book differences are again positive and statistically significantly different from zero, except in the last panel, where the coefficient is positive but not significant. To interpret the magnitude of the coefficient on market to book ratios from the equation in Column 4, keeping all other variables constant, the model implies that a difference of one in market-to-book ratios leads to an expected increase of 7% increase in the volume of cross-border mergers.
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We break down the impact of country-level market to book ratio differences on mergers by the relative wealth of the countries and by the regional differences in the remaining columns of Table   5 , Panel A. These results suggest that, consistent with the results using returns and currencies, valuation differences are most important when firms from wealthier countries purchase firms from nearby poorer countries. This pattern is consistent with some cross-border mergers occurring when to which all market and currency movements affect merger propensities, or if the effect is only important for extreme movements. 20 For deals within region, the effect is the sum of the coefficient on ∆Market R12 plus the coefficient on this variable interacted with the "Same Region" dummy variable. Since the sum of these coefficients equals zero, the net effect of stock market returns for within region mergers is zero. 21 A difference of one (or larger) in country-level market-to-book ratios is not uncommon. For example market-tobook ratios for the U.K. and Belgium in 1997 are respectively 2.7 and 1.7 for a difference of one, while market-tobook ratios for the U.S. and South Korea in 1998 are respectively 2.6 and 0.6,which is a difference of two.
firms in richer countries purchasing firms from nearby poorer countries when they are relatively inexpensive following a currency depreciation or a decline in the poorer country's stock market.
Interpreting the Relation between Valuation and Merger Propensities.
There are two possible explanations for the relation between valuation and merger propensities. Increases in relative valuation, either through stock price increases or currency appreciation, could reflect real increases in wealth, leading to improved firms' abilities to finance acquisitions (Froot and Stein (1991)). Alternatively, the changes in relative valuation could reflect errors in valuation, in which case firms should rationally take advantage of this misvaluation to purchase relatively cheap assets, i.e., firms in another country that are not as overvalued (Shleifer and
Vishny (2003)). The overvaluation argument applies mainly to public acquirers who can either issue equity or make stock acquisitions to take advantage of the high valuation, but as Baker et al. (2009) argue, it could potentially apply to private acquirers as well if the overvalued equity market lowers the cost of capital in a country for private firms. Of course, the Shleifer and Vishny argument applied to undervaluation following a currency crisis or large stock market decline would apply equally for public and private firms.
A prediction of the incorrect relative valuation argument is that subsequent to acquisitions by relatively overvalued firms, there should be a price reversal and acquirers should underperform relative to targets. In particular, the overvaluation argument implies that if an acquirer purchases a target to arbitrage differences in the price levels across countries, these differences should narrow subsequent to the acquisition. To evaluate this possibility, we include future return differences in Panel A of Table 6 . The results are somewhat ambiguous, but seem to indicate that, if anything, the difference in currency returns tends to persist following the acquisition. This pattern is inconsistent with the notion that overvaluation explains the impact of valuation on merger decisions.
To test this hypothesis formally, we follow an approach developed by Baker et al. (2009).
These authors argue that the market to book ratio can be broken into two components: the component due to real expected wealth and the component due to over or under reaction by the market to news.
To estimate the magnitude of each component, Baker et al. (2009) estimate equations where the market to book ratio is a function of future stock returns. To the extent that the market to book ratio reflects overvaluation at the time of acquisitions, periods of high acquisitions should be followed by periods of poor returns. The "fitted" component of market to book should represent that component arising from overvaluation while the "residual" component comes from real wealth effect.
In the first-stage equation, where country-level market-to-book ratios are predicted using future returns, the coefficients on future returns are negative. This finding is consistent with the literature and suggests that higher country-level market-to-book ratios do lead to lower future stock returns in that country. However, when we break down the market to book differences between countries into "fitted" and "residual" components (see Panel B of Table 6 ), for most specifications only the residual is positively related to acquisitions, as predicted by the wealth-effect hypothesis.
Only in the sample of acquisitions of private firms, for which stock market misvaluation is least likely to affect acquisitions, is the difference of the fitted values statistically significant. 22 In the sample of deals involving public targets and acquirers, the coefficient on the difference in fitted components is actually negative, which is the opposite of what the overvaluation hypothesis predicts.
Consequently, this evidence suggests that the valuation effect occurs because of the wealth effect described by Froot and Stein (1991) rather than the mispricing effect discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
Valuation Using Deal-Level Panel Data
We have documented that valuation appears to play an important role in determining which firms are likely to merge. Acquirers tend to be valued relatively highly compared to targets, using prior returns or market to book ratios as measures of valuation. This difference in valuation between acquirers and targets appears to occur due to both stock market and currency effects. Yet, the results presented so far are all done at the country level. Consequently, they do not control for firm-level factors that potentially affect the decision to merge, including the firm's own valuation.
To control for firm-level factors, we consider the subsample of firms for which we have public data on both acquirers and targets. Unfortunately, this subsample is both relatively small and unrepresentative of the overall sample of mergers, because firms in this subsample are much more likely to be from developed rather than developing countries. Of the 56,978 cross-border mergers in our sample, only 911 have both public acquirers and targets, and also have data available on firm level variables we use to control for other factors that potentially affect mergers. Of these 911 mergers, 877 have acquirers from developed countries and 780 targets are from developed countries.
While these mergers are interesting in their own right, they are not representative of cross-border mergers in general.
To estimate the factors that affect mergers, one would ideally like to consider every possible pair of firms that could conceivably merge and estimate the likelihood that any two of them actually do merge. Unfortunately, this approach would be infeasible as the number of possible combinations would be extremely large relative to the number of actual mergers. Instead, we adopt two alternative approaches designed to infer the factors leading one firm to buy another.
4.5.1. Cross-Border vs. Domestic Mergers.
We first consider the sample of all mergers of publicly traded firms (including domestic ones), and estimate the characteristics of the firms involved with the merger that are associated with it being a cross-border that lead a particular merger to be either cross-border or domestic. We estimate logit models that predict whether an observed merger is domestic or cross-border as a function of deal characteristics. Intuitively, this approach presumes that domestic mergers can provide a benchmark through which we can understand the nature of cross-border mergers.
We present estimates of these equations in Table 7 . The first two columns include the difference in the acquirer and target returns, converted to U.S. dollars, as an explanatory variable.
Both coefficients are positive and in the second column, which controls for whether the two firms are in the related industries and the sizes of the targets and acquirers, the coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero. The positive coefficient indicates that cross-border acquisitions tend to have larger return differences between acquirers and targets.
In Columns 3 and 4 we break up the return differences into three components, the differences in local stock market indices, the currency return between the two countries' currencies, and the differences in firm-level excess returns relative to the market. 23 The coefficients on all three variables are positive, but often insignificant. The positive coefficients on currency differences and differences in local market returns are consistent with the valuation arguments and suggest that differences in these variables are determinants of cross-border mergers.
Predicting the identity of target and acquirers
Another way to evaluate the motives for cross-border mergers is to characterize the attributes of the firms involved as targets and acquirers relative to each other. If the underlying reason for the merger is to take advantage of valuation differences, then one ought to be able to predict which firms will be acquirers or targets using measures of valuation. Consequently, we consider the sample consisting of all firms involved in a public/public cross-border merger and estimate equations predicting whether a particular firm is a target or acquirer. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate the equations by logit and present the results in Table 8 . We estimate these equations for both domestic and cross-border mergers; the domestic mergers are in Columns 1-4 while the cross-border ones are in 5-8.
The results in Table 8 indicate that for both domestic and cross-border mergers, acquirers outperform targets prior to the acquisition. This finding is consistent with prior literature on 23 For the domestic deals, the differences in the local market returns and the currency returns will be identically zero.
domestic mergers suggesting that acquirers typically have higher valuations than targets. In Columns 7 and 8, we break down each return for the cross-border sample into 3 components, reflecting the local stock market index (in local currency), the currency return (relative to U.S. dollars), and the local firm-specific residual. The results indicate that only the firm specific component of returns is related to whether a firm is an acquirer or a target, not the local stock-market return or the currency return. These results are somewhat different from what we found at the country level but similar to the deal-level regressions in Table 7 using the domestic/cross-border specification. This difference between country-level results and deal-level results is somewhat puzzling and could potentially reflect the fact the sample of public cross-border deals is relatively small and concentrated in developed countries, for which pre-acquisition currency differences are very small (see Table 4 ).
Conclusion
About one-third of worldwide mergers combine firms from two different countries. As the world's economy becomes increasingly integrated, cross-border mergers are likely to become even more important in the future. Yet, in the voluminous academic literature on mergers, the vast majority of research has studied domestic deals. Moreover, what little work that has been done on cross-border mergers has focused on public and/or U.S. based firms. Understanding the patterns and motivations for cross-border mergers is consequently an important and understudied research topic.
In contrast to the presumptions of the academic literature, most cross-border mergers do not involve U.S. firms and do involve privately-held firms. In our sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers that occurred between 1990 and 2007, 97% involved a private firm as either acquirer or target, while 53% did not involve a U.S. firm. Geography matters; the odds of acquiring a firm in a nearby country are substantially higher than the odds of acquiring a firm in a country far away. In addition, higher economic development, better legal protection and better accounting quality are all associated with the likelihood of being an acquirer rather than a target.
A major factor determining the pattern of cross-border mergers is currency movements. Over the entire sample period, countries whose currencies have appreciated are more likely to have acquiring firms while countries whose currencies have depreciated are more likely to have targeted firms. Controlling for these overall time trends econometrically, short-term movements between two countries' currencies increase the likelihood that firms in the country with the appreciating currency purchase firms in the country with the depreciating currency.
In addition, the relative stock market performance between two countries affects the propensity of firms in these countries to merge. Our estimates indicate that the greater the difference in stock market performance between the countries, the more likely that firms in the superiorperforming country purchase firms in the worse-performing country.
The impacts of currency movements and of stock market performance on merger propensities are likely symptomatic of a more general valuation effect, in which more highly valued firms tend to purchase lower-valued firms. This effect has been documented for domestic acquisitions of U.S. firms in a number of studies, and has been generally attributed to misvaluation arguments ( Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) ). Yet in an international context, there is an additional reason why higher-valued firms would purchase lower-valued firms; firms from wealthier countries will have a tendency to purchase firms from poorer countries because of a cost of capital effect described by Froot and Stein (1991) . We evaluate both the mispricing and wealth explanations econometrically and find support for the wealth explanation rather than the mispricing explanation.
With the increasing integration of the world economy, it is likely that more mergers will involve firms from different countries. We have provided a preliminary analysis of the patterns and reasons for cross-border mergers. Some of these mergers undoubtedly occur for the same synergistic reasons as domestic mergers. Yet others appear to reflect country-level factors such as currency appreciation and macroeconomic performance. The extent to which each type of factor affects the likelihood of firms to purchase one another is an important topic for future research. World sample mean excluding deals involving U.S. firms.
World sample of public firms. Table 3 Cross-sectional analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As. Dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in target country i. ∆ (Currency R12) j-i is the difference in the average annual real exchange rate return in US$ from 1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Market R12) j-i is the difference in the average annual local real stock market return from 1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Account) j-i is the difference in the index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information. ∆ (Legal) j=i is the difference in the shareholder protection index computed as the product of rule of law and antidirector rights (LLSV(1998) ). Same Language is equal to 1 if target and acquirer's primary language (English, Spanish or others) are the same. Same Religion is equal to 1 if target and acquirer's primary religion (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist or Others) are the same (Stulz and Williamson (2003)). Geographic proximity is minus the great circle distance calculated using the longitudes and latitudes of the capital cities of target and acquirer countries. Average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product is from 1990 to 2007 and Gross national product divided by the population is in 1990 (in US$), both from the WDI report. We calculate Huber-White standard errors.
All Target Table 5 Analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As using panel data on country pairs. Dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in country i. ∆ Currency R12 is the difference in the past12-month real exchange rate return between acquirer and target country. ∆ Market R12 is the difference in the past 12-month local real stock market return between acquirer and target country. ∆Market MTB is the difference in the value-weighted market equity to book equity ratio between acquirer and target country. Higher GDP per capital is equal to 1 if acquirer country's GDP per capita is larger than or equal to that of target country. Standard errors are robust.
All Targets Table 6 Mispricing vs fundamental: Interpreting the relation between valuation and cross-border mergers. Dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in country i. ∆ Currency FR12 is the difference in the next12-month real exchange rate return between acquirer and target country. ∆ Market FR12 is the difference in the future 12-month local real stock market return between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Fitted MTB) is the difference in the predicted value-weighted market-equity-to-book-equity ratio between acquirer and target country, using future 12-, 24-, 36-month local real stock market return and real exchange rate return. ∆ (Residual MTB) is the difference in the residuals of value-weighted market equity to book equity ratio between acquirer and target country, using future 12-, 24-, 36-month local real stock market return and real exchange rate return. Fitted MTB=2.017-0.033FR12-0.137FR24-0.299FR36-0.255EXFR12-0.247EXFR24+0.487EXFR36 (N=642, R 2 =0.094). Higher GDP per capita is equal to 1 if acquirer country's GDP per capita is larger than or equal to that of target country. Panel A reports regressions using future12-month stock market and exchange rate returns. Panel B reports regressions using decomposed market to book ratio. Standard errors are robust.
Panel A -Direct tests using future returns. Table 7 Deal-level analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the M&A deal is cross-border. The sample include deals in which both target and acquirer are public. Columns (1) and (2) use the difference in previous year's firm-level stock returns in $US between the acquirer and the target. Columns (3) and (4) decompose the difference in firm-level stock returns in $US into 3 parts: market returns in local currency (∆Market R12), currency returns (∆Currency R12), and firm residual stock returns in local currency (∆Firm USR12-∆Market R12-∆Currency R12). Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are robust.
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